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Between 2001 and the first half of 2007 large parts of the world experienced a prolonged 
period of high economic growth. Risk perceptions declined and the global financial system 
was characterised by abundant liquidity. This changed with the onset of the financial crisis in 
August 2007 which affected banks through increased uncertainty over borrower quality and a 
drop in funding. In many countries banks sharply curtailed new credit (Aisen and Franken, 
2010) and global syndicated lending fell by 41 per cent in 2008 alone (Dealogic Loan 
Analytics). This forced credit-constrained firms to reduce investments (Duchin, Ozbas and 
Sensoy, 2010) and ultimately propagated the crisis from the financial to the real side of the 
global economy. 
We assess to what extent stricter screening and monitoring by banks may have contributed to 
the reduction in corporate bank lending during the crisis. The screening and monitoring of 
borrowers on behalf of depositors and other financiers – delegated monitoring – is a key 
function of banks (Diamond, 1984; 1991; 1996). The intensity with which banks perform this 
task depends on the level of asymmetric information in relation to the specific borrower and 
may therefore vary across customer types (Sufi, 2007) and over time (Holmström and Tirole, 
1997). In this paper we test whether banks’ screening and monitoring intensified at the onset 
of the financial crisis in mid-2007 and, if so, which borrower types were most affected by 
this. 
The 2007/2009 global financial crisis originated in the US sub-prime mortgage market. 
Various empirical studies have uncovered evidence that before the crisis banks had gradually 
relaxed their screening and monitoring standards in this market (Dell’Ariccia, Igan and 
Laeven, 2008). Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2010) and Mian and Sufi (2009) show that 
securitisation in particular reduced the incentives of US mortgage lenders to properly screen 
borrowers. We hypothesise that the large-scale losses that materialised in the US sub-prime 
market in the autumn of 2007 led banks to reassess their screening and monitoring standards 
more broadly. Analogous to the literature on the transmission of financial crises, we call this 
sudden and broad increase in risk awareness a “wake-up call”: a tightening of screening and 
monitoring above and beyond what would be warranted on the basis of increased borrower 
risk alone.
1,2 
There are a number of reasons why the crisis may have induced banks to intensify their 
screening and monitoring efforts for the same level of borrower risk. The collapse of the 
secondary market for (syndicated) loans likely played a role. Before the crisis loans could 
easily be sold on the secondary market, but when the problems in the US sub-prime market 
surfaced lenders could no longer offload their loans to (institutional) investors and had to 
keep them on their own books. This increased incentives to adequately screen and monitor 
borrowers.
3 Furthermore, many CLO/CDO (collateralised loan/debt obligation) managers 
exited the (syndicated) loan market. To the extent that these lenders followed less stringent 
screening standards, the remaining lenders in the market put more emphasis on screening and 
                                                 
1 Goldstein (1998) coined the term “wake-up call” to describe how international investors reassessed their 
lending to all Asian borrowers when they were confronted with instability in the specific case of Thailand. See 
also Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003) and Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2003). 
2 Ruckes (2004) shows that when the default probability of borrowers increases, lenders start to screen more 
thoroughly. Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (2004), and Steffen and Wahrenburg (2008) also find that lending 
standards are relaxed during business cycle upswings and tightened during negative economic shocks. 
3 Berndt and Gupta (2009) find evidence that the possibility of securitisation in the pre-crisis period led to a 
relaxation of lending standards. Borrowers whose syndicated loans were sold in the secondary loan market 
under-perform their peers, suggesting that the originate-to-distribute model stimulated adverse selection and/or 
moral hazard among banks. 
  1monitoring. More generally, it can be argued that the abundant short-term wholesale funding 
that was available to banks before the crisis was one of the main reasons why banks had 
gradually reduced their screening and monitoring intensity in the first place (Perotti and 
Suarez, 2009). Providers of (very) short-term funding to banks were less concerned with 
imposing discipline because they could exit banks at short notice anyway. The drying up of 
short-term funding may thus have contributed to the restoration of screening and monitoring 
discipline in banks. 
Empirical evidence on the link between banks’ screening and monitoring standards and the 
credit decline during the crisis is still lacking (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010a). An important 
reason is that banks’ screening and monitoring efforts are largely unobservable. Empirical 
researchers therefore proxy it through using observable variables such as denial rates and 
loan-to-income ratios (Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven, 2008), asking bank managers about 
their lending standards through surveys (Maddaloni, Peydró and Scopel, 2009), or making 
inferences about the strictness of screening and monitoring by examining ex post loan quality 
(Berndt and Gupta, 2009 and Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010). In contrast, we study 
the syndicated loan market and exploit variation in the loan share that arrangers of syndicated 
loans need to keep on their own balance sheet, the retention rate. The syndicated loan market 
is particularly well-suited to assess changes in screening and monitoring by banks. First, the 
crisis exposed some deeper flaws in the originate-to-distribute banking model and the 
syndicated loan market shares some important characteristics of this model. So, if the crisis 
induced banks to step up their screening and monitoring efforts this should definitely have 
occurred in this market. Second, the structure of lending syndicates directly reflects the 
importance that banks attach to the screening and monitoring of borrowers (Dennis and 
Mullineaux, 2000; Jones, Lang and Nigro, 2005; Sufi, 2007).
4 A short primer on loan 
syndication will make this clear. 
Syndicated loans are provided by a group of financial institutions – the syndicate – to a single 
borrower.
5 They have become a major source of external finance for a variety of firms in the 
developed world and emerging markets (DTCC, 2008). A typical syndicate consists of two 
tiers: arrangers and participants. The arrangers comprise the senior tier and negotiate the 
lending terms with the borrower, who gives the arrangers a mandate to structure and market 
the loan. Arrangers usually allocate a substantial part of a loan to a junior tier of syndicate 
members, the participants. Participants have a more passive role: they buy a portion of the 
loan but are neither involved in its organisation nor in the screening and monitoring of the 
borrower. For their internal credit approval processes participants rely on the borrower 
information that is provided by the arranger(s) in the form of an information memorandum 
(Fight, 2004). Participants usually do not perform additional borrower due diligence. For 
monitoring the participants rely on the arrangers as well, who provide them with periodical 
audited and unaudited accounts and information on the observance of loan covenants. 
We hypothesise that at an early stage of the crisis banks tightened their screening and 
monitoring standards, causing a sharp increase in retention rates. The main reason why 
                                                 
4 Arguably banks’ screening can best be measured by analysing loan denial rates. However, information on loan 
applications is difficult to obtain and usually only available for a particular country (for instance, Jiménez, 
Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina (2010) use data from the Spanish credit registry) or a particular type of bank (Puri, 
Rocholl, and Steffen (2009) examine loan applications at German Landesbanks). Furthermore, loan denial rates 
do not provide information about banks’ monitoring efforts. By contrast, the retention rate is available on a 
much broader scale and captures both screening and monitoring efforts (Sufi, 2007). 
5 Through syndication loans are spread across several institutions, allowing each bank to diversify its loan 
portfolio (Simons, 1993). Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and Fight (2004) provide extensive descriptions of the 
syndicated loan market. 
  2increased screening and monitoring translates into higher retention rates is that participants 
use arrangers as delegated monitors (Diamond, 1984). This entails a functional division 
between the arranger – responsible for screening and monitoring the borrower – and the 
institution that provides the funding and ultimately bears the risk. Compared with bilateral 
lending, where a bank bears all credit risk, arranging banks have a reduced incentive to 
screen and monitor. To resolve this agency problem arrangers can retain a large enough loan 
portion on their own balance sheet. Such “skin in the game” is an efficient incentive-
compatible mechanism to ensure that arrangers sufficiently screen and monitor (Pennacchi, 
1988; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Holmström and Tirole, 1997).
6 Syndicate participants 
that want borrowers to be screened and monitored more intensely therefore force arrangers to 
retain higher loan portions (Sufi, 2007).
7 We consequently expect that if participant banks 
became more concerned about screening and monitoring at the start of the crisis – a wake-up 
call – this led to a significant increase in retention rates. 
By syndicating part of the loans they structure, arrangers free up space on their balance sheet. 
This allows them to originate additional loans and earn fee income. When arrangers only 
need to retain a small portion of each loan, they can originate a large number of syndicated 
loans and the supply of lending is high. Conversely, when capital-constrained arrangers are 
required to retain a large loan portion, they can syndicate fewer loans and the supply of 
syndicated credit is lower. 
 
Chart 1 
Retention rate and syndicated lending volume
Arrow 'a' shows an increase in screening and monitoring due to higher borrower risk during the crisis. Arrow 'b' shows an increase in
screening and monitoring due to an increase in screening and monitoring intensity ('wake-up call') during the crisis
The figure shows the evolution of the average retention rate and the volume of syndicated lending over the period January 2005 - October 2009.
Loans to (quasi-) government entities, loans where an international financial institution is a syndicate member, project finance loans and club loans
are excluded. Retention rate measures the share of the loan jointly held by all arrangers. Total loan volume includes both loans with and without
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6 A related literature analyses similar issues in the context of underwriters’ retention rates during an IPO (Chen, 
Jhou and Yeh, 2007, and Corwin and Schultz, 2005). 
7 Increases in retention rates are unlikely to be voluntary but instead reflect pressures from participants. Ivashina 
(2009) finds that arrangers that need to retain a larger loan portion, charge a higher spread to the borrower in 
order to compensate for the reduced ability to optimally diversify their loan portfolio. 
  3Fluctuations in retention rates may thus be inversely related to the supply of syndicated 
lending. Indeed, Chart 1 shows that after the beginning of the crisis in mid-2007 a sharp 
increase in retention rates was accompanied by a steep decline in syndicated lending 
volumes.
8 
If increased screening and monitoring caused the sharp increase in retention rates during the 
crisis, loan retention should have risen in particular when information asymmetries between 
lenders and the borrower were large (Sufi, 2007). Participants likely became most concerned 
about adequate screening and borrowing in the case of opaque loans. Arrangers consequently 
experienced a relatively sharp drop in interest for such loans, prompting them to retain more 
in order to placate potential participants. Similarly, we expect that when information 
asymmetries were particularly large within a syndicate – that is, between participants and 
arrangers – retention rates increased more as well. The sharp reduction in interbank lending 
that characterised the crisis reflected a decreased trust among banks, at least in terms of being 
each other’s lending counterparties. This eroded trust may also have increased the costs of 
delegation (Diamond, 1984; 1991) and as such have negatively affected banks’ ability to 
cooperate within syndicates. 
To analyse both layers of agency problems – between lenders and borrowers and among 
lenders – we exploit the detailed information on market, borrower and lender heterogeneity in 
our dataset. Specifically, we test whether the increase in retention rates during the crisis was 
positively related to various proxies for information asymmetries. Such cross-sectional 
linkages between the severity of information asymmetries and the increase in retention rates 
would provide critical evidence that the overall increase in retention rates, and the associated 
decline in syndicated lending, was caused by stricter screening and monitoring. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that – even when controlling for changes in 
interbank liquidity and borrower risk – the crisis led to a significant and robust increase in 
arrangers’ retention rates. This increase materialised during the early phase of the crisis, 
before the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing sharp output decline. Second, 
retention rates increased considerably more when information asymmetries were high, such 
as in the case of loans to first-time borrowers or borrowers in opaque industries. For example, 
while the retention rate for loans to first-time borrowers increased by almost 11 per cent, 
arrangers of syndicated loans to borrowers with average borrowing experience (two and a 
half loans) only needed to increase their retention rate by 7.6 per cent during the crisis. 
Moreover, we find that experienced arrangers needed to increase their retention rates less 
than less reputable arrangers. Retention rates also increased less when either the participant or 
the arranger had prior lending experience with the borrower, its industry or its country. These 
findings point to a sudden increase in banks’ screening and monitoring at the start of the 
crisis: a wake-up call. 
Our paper is related and contributes to three mains strands of the literature. First, it sheds 
light on the root causes of the transformation of the 2007 financial crisis into the 2008-09 
economic crisis. Empirical evidence on the reduction of the supply of bank credit during the 
crisis is emerging slowly. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010b) show that US banks sharply 
reduced their supply of new corporate lending and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2009) document 
how US banks also reduced their credit to emerging markets during the crisis. For Germany, 
Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2009) provide evidence of a crisis-related reduction in lending to 
retail customers. These studies explore the impact of the crisis on the quantity of bank 
lending, while we analyse in more detail why banks reduced lending. 
                                                 
8 Due to reporting lags we may somewhat underestimate the loan volume in the third quarter of 2009 as our final 
data download was conducted at the beginning of October 2009 (cf. Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010b). 
  4Second, our paper is related to recent developments in the literature on monetary transmission 
mechanisms. Borio and Zhu (2008) argue that bank lending standards fluctuate in line with 
the monetary policy stance and that this relationship is stronger than warranted by the impact 
of monetary policy on borrower net worth. That is: lending standards fluctuate more than can 
be explained by the balance sheet channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). Jiménez, Ongena, 
Peydró and Saurina (2008) and Maddaloni, Peydró and Scopel (2009) find evidence for this 
channel by showing that low short-term interest rates made banks lend to more risky 
borrowers. Analogous to this credit-risk taking channel, we analyse whether the crisis acted 
as a wake-up call during which banks fundamentally reassessed screening and monitoring 
standards.
9 
Third, we contribute to the burgeoning literature on syndicated lending. Earlier papers have 
studied the structure of lending syndicates to analyse how banks deal with asymmetric 
information (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Sufi, 2007), weak 
creditor rights (Esty and Megginson, 2003), the risk of strategic defaults (Preece and 
Mullineaux, 1996) and intra-syndicate cultural differences (Giannetti and Yafeh, 2008). We 
contribute by analysing how the financial crisis and the associated increase in credit and 
liquidity risk influenced the structure of lending syndicates. As such our results also 
contribute to the debate about the costs and benefits of securitisation and the role of loan 
retention (see for instance Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). Although the legal structures 
surrounding loan syndication and loan securitisation are different
10, the potential agency 
problems – adverse selection and moral hazard – are the same. Our study adds to this 
literature by providing insights into how retention rates adjust to market pressure during a 
crisis. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical 
methodology and data. Section 3 explains our empirical results, following which section 4 
presents a set of robustness tests. Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
                                                 
9 The balance sheet and bank lending channel (Bernanke, 1983) also have a shock equivalent in the seminal 
Holmström and Tirole (1997) model, where they are called “collateral squeeze” and “credit crunch”, 
respectively. 
10 A loan sale or securitisation does not change the contract between the borrower and the original lender. 
Instead a new contract is created by the lender and a third party to sell the cash flow from the underlying loan. In 
a syndicated loan, all lenders are and remain part of one loan contract with the borrower. 
  52. Methodology and data 
2.1. Empirical methodology 
Our aim is to test whether the increase in retention rates during the crisis can be attributed to 
an increased focus on screening and monitoring. In order to provide compelling evidence it is 
crucial to distinguish the impact of screening and monitoring from other possible 
explanations for increased retention rates during the crisis. To do this we employ the 
following identification strategy. 
Our main variable to capture the importance of screening and monitoring is a crisis dummy 
(Crisis) that indicates the structural break or wake-up call effect at the beginning of the crisis. 
Crisis equals zero for syndicated loans signed between January 2005 and September 2007 
and one for loans signed during the crisis period, which we define as October 2007-October 
2009 (October 2009 is the cut-off date of our dataset). We let the crisis start in October rather 
than August 2007 because of the time lag between starting loan negotiations and signing a 
deal.
11 The negotiation and arrangement process takes on average eight weeks (Godlewski, 
2008). Almost 30 per cent of observations concern loans signed during the crisis; the 
remainder was signed pre-crisis. If screening and monitoring increased during the crisis this 
should be reflected in a positive and significant crisis dummy. 
Since we are interested to find out whether the outbreak of the crisis led to a broad 
reassessment of banks’ screening and monitoring standards, we also include a Post Lehman 
dummy variable that is one for loans signed after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. This 
allows us to test whether an increase in retention rates happened before or only after the 
Lehman bankruptcy and the resulting sharp decline in global economic growth. A “late” 
increase in retention rates would reflect that banks adjusted their standards mainly in reaction 
to sharply reduced growth prospects and an overall increase in credit risk. In contrast, an 
“early” increase in retention rates would show that even before the massive shock of the 
Lehman collapse banks had already learned a lesson from the sub-prime debacle and had 
started to increase their screening and monitoring efforts across the board. 
A positive and early crisis impact on retention rates is necessary but not sufficient proof for 
the existence of a wake-up call effect. A first alternative explanation for increased retention 
rates during the crisis is reduced market liquidity. A reduction in interbank liquidity can drive 
up retention rates if arrangers decide to retain larger loan portions when financially 
constrained participants become less eager to participate. Arrangers may retain more of a loan 
if this is necessary to let a syndication go ahead. The alternative – failure to raise enough 
money to fulfill the borrower’s mandate – may damage the arranger’s reputation, its 
relationship with key borrowers, and future business. The arranger would also forego the fees 
she earns for structuring syndicated loans (an important source of non-interest income). 
However, the relationship between retention rates and interbank liquidity is not completely 
straightforward. It is possible that arrangers and participants are hit equally hard by a 
liquidity shock so that the distribution of a syndicated loan over both types of lenders remains 
the same, leaving retention rates largely unaffected. 
Since the precise impact of liquidity on retention rates is ultimately an empirical matter, we 
control for changes in interbank liquidity by including the TED spread (TED): the difference 
                                                 
11 On Thursday 9 August 2007, the European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve injected substantial 
amounts of liquidity into their banking systems. Other central banks soon followed suit. That week also saw the 
TED spread – the difference between three-month LIBOR and the three-month T-bill rate – spike above 100 
basis points for the first time. 
  6between the three-month interest rate on interbank loans (LIBOR) and US government T-
bills. It is a measure of banks’ (un)willingness to lend to each other and as such a “useful 
basis for gauging the severity of the current liquidity crisis” (Brunnermeier, 2009, p. 85). If 
illiquidity was an important cause of the retention rate increase, we expect a positive 
relationship between illiquidity – as measured by the TED spread – and the retention rates in 
loan syndicates. 
Chart 2 shows that during the crisis the TED spread increased rapidly and almost in sync with 
the fast increase in retention rates. However, it also shows that during the crisis – indicated by 
the grey area – retention rates not only increased but stayed high even when liquidity returned 
at end-2008 in response to the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s programme of foreign 
exchange swaps with other central banks. This suggests that besides liquidity other factors 
have been (more) important drivers of the persistent increase in retention rates. 
 
Chart 2
Retention rate and interbank liquidity before and during the crisis
The figure shows the development of syndicated lending volumes over the period January 2005 - October 2009. Loans to (quasi-)
government entities, loans where an international financial institution is a syndicate member, and project finance loans are excluded.
Arrow 'a' shows an increase in screening and monitoring due to higher borrower risk during the crisis. Arrow 'b' shows an increase in
screening and monitoring due to an increase in screening and monitoring intensity ('wake-up call') during the crisis
The figure shows the evolution of the average retention rate and the TED spread over the period January 2005 - October 2009. Loans to (quasi-)
government entities, loans where an international financial institution is a syndicate member, project finance loans and club loans are excluded.
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A second possible explanation for increased retention rates during the crisis is an increase in 
borrower risk. Fortunately our dataset contains a variety of loan and borrower characteristics 
that allow us to control to a large extent for borrower and loan risk. In all regressions we 
include a matrix Xi of loan and borrower-specific variables that capture different risk 
elements to isolate the crisis impact on retention rates above and beyond the effect on 
borrower quality.
12 However, since it is impossible to fully control for all dimensions of 
borrower risk, a positive and significant crisis dummy may still (partly) reflect changes in 
unobserved borrower risk rather than increased screening and monitoring. We therefore need 
an additional identification strategy to isolate the screening and monitoring effect from the 
                                                 
12 Loan-specific variables such as maturity, amount and collateral are specified before the syndication process 
(during the negotiations between the arrangers and the borrower) and are exogenous to the syndicate structure. 
  7possible impact of unobserved borrower risk. For this we exploit the heterogeneous character 
of our dataset with respect to the level of information asymmetry. 
If screening and monitoring became more important during the crisis this should especially 
be the case for loans where participants are particularly worried about adequate borrower 
screening and monitoring. Such concerns may be caused by borrower opaqueness 
(information asymmetry between the borrower and the syndicate; cf. Simons, 1993 and Sufi, 
2007) or by a lack of trust in the arrangers’ ability and willingness to screen and monitor 
(information asymmetry within the syndicate; cf. Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000). We 
therefore expect a stronger crisis-induced increase in retention rates for loans characterised by 
large information asymmetries. 
Such a differentiated increase is not only in line with our wake-up call hypothesis but also 
indicates that we adequately control for increased borrower risk during the crisis. A 
differentiated increase in retention rates could only reflect unobserved borrower risk (rather 
than intensified screening and monitoring) if unobserved borrower risk would be high for 
loans characterised by high information asymmetry and low for loans characterised by low 
information asymmetry. Although this may be the case for certain measures of information 
asymmetry, such as whether the borrower is rated or not, it is highly unlikely for other 
measures we use, such as the number of previous interactions between the arrangers and 
participants. So, finally we interact Crisis with a matrix Ii of information asymmetry variables 
to test whether the crisis impact was particularly strong for loans with high levels of 
information asymmetries. Our specification looks as follows: 
 
(1)    i i i i i I Crisis I X TED Crisis RR                    
' ' '
2 1  
 
where subscript i indicates individual loans and γ, λ and φ are coefficient vectors. The 
dependent variable is one of the following retention rate measures (RRi): the share of the loan 
jointly held by all arrangers, the average share of the loan held by each arranger, or the share 
of the loan jointly held by the two main arrangers. Although our dependent variables are 
censored between 0 and 1, truncation is not a problem in practice as values are neither 
clustered around the upper nor the lower bound, and we therefore use OLS. Robustness tests 
in Section 4 show that our results are consistent when using a Tobit model. We experiment 
with sector dummies but these are mostly statistically insignificant and we thus exclude them. 
Including sector dummies does not change any of our results. Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the borrower level. 
 
2.2. Data and summary statistics 
Our main data source is Dealogic Loan Analytics which provides comprehensive data on 
virtually all global syndicated loans. Lenders have a strong incentive to report to Dealogic as 
the financial press uses this database to generate league tables of successful arrangers. Our 
download contains information on syndicated loans to private borrowers across 62 countries. 
These include the United States, western Europe, various other high-income countries, as 
well as a number of emerging markets.
13 All loans were signed between January 2005 and 
                                                 
13 We exclude countries without significant syndicated borrowing (less than 25 loans over the sample period). 
We also exclude the Japanese syndications market as it is heavily dominated by just four Japanese institutions 
(Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Mizuho Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp. and UFJ Bank) that focus almost 
  8October 2009. Just over 60 per cent of the loans in our sample consist of multiple tranches. In 
those cases we compute weighted averages for our variables at the loan level, weighing each 
tranche by its amount. Tranches are negotiated at the same point in time, are part of one 
contract and cannot be treated econometrically as individual observations (Sufi, 2007). Using 
the loan as the unit of observation also prevents oversampling. 
In the case of interbank lending the issues of funding illiquidity and screening and monitoring 
intensity are closely intertwined as increased screening and a reduced willingness to lend by 
one bank implies a reduction in funding for another. Worries in the interbank market about 
sub-prime mortgage exposures meant that credit risk and liquidity risk became 
interdependent during the crisis in particular. We therefore confine ourselves to bank lending 
to non-financial corporates in order to make a clear distinction between banks’ funding 
problems and their credit concerns. 
Our dataset contains information about the borrower (country of incorporation, industry and 
credit rating), loan terms (maturity, volume, currency, spread, fee structure and loan purpose), 
and syndicate structure (number and identity of arrangers and participants). We categorise all 
syndicate members as either arrangers or participant banks. Arrangers are financial 
institutions with the title of mandated lead arranger or book runner.
14 We classify all other 
syndicate members as participants.
15 For each loan we check the availability of information 
on the identity of the syndicate members. We only keep loans with complete and consistent 
information and exclude loans to government entities, loans with an international financial 
institution as a syndicate member, and project finance loans (see Section 4). Only about 25 
per cent of the loan entries in Loan Analytics contain information on the share of the loan 
held by each lender (information we need to calculate our dependent variables). As a result, 
our full-information dataset contains 4,435 loans (see Appendix Table 1 for a geographical 
breakdown). Overall, this subsample is quite similar to the full data download. However, the 
loans in our subsample are on average somewhat smaller due to the over-representation of 
loans to Asian borrowers and the under-representation of loans to US borrowers. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables that we use in our empirical analysis. 
Over the 2005-09 period arrangers kept on average about half of each loan on their balance 
sheet. A substantial portion (39 per cent of the loan) is concentrated in the hands of the two 
largest arrangers (on average a loan is arranged by 2.9 arrangers). The average loan size is 
US$ 369 million and the average maturity 4.7 years (both variables are included in logs in the 
regressions). 
The detailed information on borrower and loan characteristics in our dataset allows us to 
control for various deal characteristics. We create three dummy variables to single out loans 
that are explicitly designated to refinance an existing loan (Refin, 30 per cent of the sample), 
to acquire a company (Acq, 10 per cent) or to be used for general corporate purposes such as 
working capital (Corp, 42 per cent). We also include two risk mitigant dummies that indicate 
whether repayment is guaranteed by a third-party (Guarantee) and whether the loan is 
secured through collateral (Secure). About 12 per cent of the loans is guaranteed while 26 per 
cent is collateralised. Whereas guarantees and collateral may contain loss-given default, their 
presence also indicates high ex ante risks. Collateralised loans in particular tend to be granted 
                                                                                                                                                        
exclusively on funding Japanese clients at home or overseas (Rhodes, 2004). Contrary to all other countries in 
our sample no foreign lenders are active in the Japanese syndications market.  
14 Book runners sell the loan to participants but are not involved in negotiations with the borrower. 
15 We believe this is the best way to distinguish between banks that are actively involved in the loan structuring 
and marketing and those that only provide funds. However, occasionally banks are given the title of mandated 
arranger or book runner due to the amount they provide, even though they do not do any arranging work. 
  9to borrowers that need more intense monitoring (Berger and Udell, 1990).
16 We therefore 
expect higher retention rates in the case of collateralised loans. 
 
Obs Mean Median St Dev Min Max
Retention rate measures
Total share held by arrangers 4,435 0.52 0.50 0.24 0 1
Average share held by arrangers 4,435 0.28 0.22 0.19 0 1
Share of two largest arrangers 4,435 0.39 0.35 0.20 0 1
Borrower and loan characteristics
Volume (US$ million) 4,435 369 146 795 1 22,500
Maturity (years) 4,326 4.71 5.00 2.76 0.50 26.40
Loan is guaranteed 4,435 0.12 0 0.32 0 1
Loan is secured 4,435 0.26 0 0.44 0 1
Loan for refinancing purposes 4,435 0.30 0 0.46 0 1
Loan for acquisition purposes 4,435 0.10 0 0.29 0 1
Loan for general corporate purposes 4,435 0.42 0 0.49 0 1
Institutional investor loan 4,435 0.09 0 0.29 0 1
Number of arrangers in loan 4,435 2.86 2 2.65 1 35
Information asymmetry measures
Borrower reputation 4,432 2.45 2 2.17 1 18
Rated 4,435 0.17 0 0.38 0 1
Split rating industry 4,363 0.67 0.67 0.04 0.60 0.76
Share arrangers in prior loan to borrower 4,423 0.42 0 0.47 0 1
Number of times arrangers active in same sector (x 1,000) 4,423 1.27 0.58 1.77 0 13.46
Number of times arrangers active in same country (x 1,000) 4,423 4.21 0.57 7.96 0 44.97
Share participants in prior loan to borrower 4,421 0.29 0 0.40 0 1
Number of times participants active in same sector (x 1,000) 4,424 1.38 0.59 2.02 0 16.05
Number of times participants active in same country (x 1,000) 4,424 3.91 0.52 8.01 0 54.37
Arranger reputation 4,435 2.05 0.57 2.99 0 20.07
Number of times arrangers had previous dealing with participants (x 1,000) 4,421 6.28 0.97 13.33 0 101.19
Table 1: Summary statistics for syndicated loan deals 
The table shows summary statistics for the variables that we use in our model. Our sample includes 4,435 syndicated loans signed between
January 2005 and October 2009. 
 
We also create a dummy – InstInv – that indicates whether at least one of the participants is 
an institutional investor (insurance company, pension fund, private equity fund or CDO/CFO 
manager). This is the case in about 10 per cent of the deals. To the extent that such investors 
were particularly eager to participate in syndicates (Ivashina and Sun, 2010) they may have 
focused less on screening and monitoring and thus put less pressure on arrangers to retain 
larger loan portions during the crisis. 
A crucial part of our analysis is to test whether loans characterised by high information 
asymmetry saw a stronger increase in retention rates during the crisis than loans with low 
information asymmetry. Such a differentiated impact would point to an increase in banks’ 
focus on screening and monitoring (wake-up call). We therefore construct three sets of 
variables that proxy for the information asymmetry between the syndicate and the borrower:  
  proxies for the information asymmetry between the borrower and the syndication 
market as a whole 
  proxies for the information asymmetry between the borrower and the particular 
syndicate that is providing the current loan 
                                                 
16 Indeed, Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) find that the presence of collateral increases interest rate spreads on 
syndicated loans while Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) show that the retention rate of collateralised loans is 
higher so that incentives to monitor are less diluted. 
  10  proxies for the information asymmetry within the syndicate itself. 
In the first category we use RepBor, a variable that measures the number of times the 
borrower has raised a syndicated loan since 2000 (including the current loan). On average 
borrowers raised 1.5 prior loans although borrower history varies between 0 and 17 previous 
loans. A large number of successful prior loans and the associated reputation can attenuate 
information asymmetries between borrower and lenders (Diamond, 1991 and Gorton and 
Pennachi, 1995) and we expect retention rates to be lower for repeat than for first-time 
borrowers. 
We also construct Rated, a dummy variable that indicates whether the borrower has been 
rated by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and/or Moody’s. This is the case for 17 per cent of the 
loans. Rated borrowers are not necessarily less risky but they are less opaque (Lee and 
Mullineaux, 2004 and Sufi, 2007) as the output of the rating agencies’ due diligence – a 
rating and a rating report – is available to all lenders. We therefore expect a negative impact 
of the presence of a rating on the retention rate and its increase during the crisis.
17 A related 
variable is Split, which measures the share of firms in the borrower’s industry that are rated 
differently by S&P and Moody’s. We calculate this variable on the basis of a subsample of 
borrowers that are rated by both agencies. A high level of split ratings indicates that rating 
agencies often disagree on firms’ creditworthiness. We expect higher retention rates in such 
opaque industries. The average borrower in our dataset is based in an industry where 67 per 
cent of all companies have a split rating. This is somewhat higher than the mean value of 56 
per cent reported by Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004) for a sample of US bond 
issues (our dataset includes loans to a broader set of countries). 
The second set of information variables measures the information asymmetry between the 
borrower and the specific lending syndicate. BorArr measures the share of the arrangers that 
were at least once part of a syndicate to the same borrower (42 per cent on average) while 
ArrSec and ArrCountry measure the sum of the number of times that the arrangers in the 
syndicate were part of a loan to the same sector or country in the past five years, respectively. 
The average values are 1,270 and 4,210, respectively: arrangers tend to have more previous 
country than sector experience.
18 Because previous experience with a borrower, its sector, or 
its country reduces opaqueness we expect a negative impact on the required retention rates 
during the crisis (a milder wake-up call). 
We construct similar variables from the participant perspective. BorPart measures the share 
of the participants that at least once participated in a previous loan to the same borrower (on 
average almost a third), while PartSec and PartCountry measure the number of times that 
one or more of the participants participated in a loan to the same sector or country as the 
current borrower. The average values for these last two variables are 1,380 and 3,910. Like 
arrangers, participants tend to have more prior exposure to particular countries than sectors. 
The third type of information variable relates to information asymmetries within the lending 
syndicate. We construct an arranger reputation variable – ArrRep – that captures the 
experience of the arrangers of a loan (Sufi, 2007; Goplan, Nanda and Yerramilli, 2007). 
According to market practitioners: “If the arranger is one of the market leaders, it is 
                                                 
17 Arguably also information about publicly listed firms is more readily available and it would be interesting to 
test whether retention rates increased less for publicly listed firms. Unfortunately, Dealogic does not provide 
information on whether a borrower is publicly listed or not. 
18 For example, if there are three arrangers in the syndicate and the first one has been active in 50 loans to the 
same country in the past 5 years, the second one 150 times and the third one 5 times, ArrCountry will have a 
value of 205. The values of ArrSec and ArrCountry can be especially large if one or several very active 
arrangers are part of the syndicate. 
  11reasonable for a participant to assume that the transaction will have passed the internal 
quality checks of that institution and that adequate resources have been applied to the due 
diligence process. If the arranger has little or no experience handling syndicated transactions, 
more care may be necessary.” (Rhodes, 2004, p.14). Indeed, Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) 
and Lee and Mullineaux (2004) find that arrangers with a long history of repeat transactions 
are able to sell off larger parts of a loan. Champagne and Kryzanowski (2007) find that the 
probability of a participant joining a syndicate is higher in the case of more reputable 
arrangers. In line with these results, we expect lower retention rates when arrangers are more 
experienced. 
To calculate ArrRep we first determine for each year the market share of the top 200 
arrangers in the global syndication market. For a loan in year t, we then take the sum of the 
market shares in year t-1 of all arrangers of that loan. For each loan we thus approximate the 
joint market share of the arrangers in the previous year. In case an arranger is not in the 
previous year’s top 200, its market share is set to zero. The market share of arrangers is a 
good proxy for their reputation since the financial press regularly publishes league tables in 
which the top arrangers – worldwide and for individual geographical regions – are ranked 
according to the loan volume they arranged in the previous year. Higher rankings in league 
tables thus imply increased exposure and a better reputation in the financial community. On 
average the joint market share of the arrangers is about 2 per cent. 
Lastly, we create a variable – PartArr – that captures how well the participants know the 
arrangers in the syndicate. We measure the number of times each participant has interacted 
with any of the arrangers in the past five years and then add these. The participants in an 
average loan jointly had 6,280 previous interactions with any of the arrangers.
19 If 
participants worked together with the arrangers in previous deals they know what to expect 
from the arrangers and the intra-syndicate information asymmetry is relatively small. 
Arrangers may also be more inclined to monitor and screen the borrower as they value the 
continuation of the relationship with the participants. For these reasons we expect that 
retention rates increase less during the crisis when participants and arrangers worked together 
in previous loan syndications. 
 
                                                 
19 If the syndicate consists of three arrangers and four participants, the variable captures how often the 12 
different possible participant-arranger combinations occurred in the previous five years. This previous 
interaction can be a participant-arranger relationship, but it is also possible that the current participant acted as 
an arranger (or vice-versa) or that the current arranger and participant cooperated as arrangers or participants. 
  123. Empirical results 
3.1. Basic results 
Table 2 presents our basic empirical results both for all loans in our dataset as well as for a 
sub-sample of international syndicated loans (syndicates where at least one of the lenders is 
based in a different country than the borrower). Our dataset contains loans to borrowers in a 
variety of developed and emerging markets and many of these loans are provided by lenders 
from various countries as well. We nevertheless use the TED spread as a common measure of 
liquidity in the international money market because a vast majority of financial institutions 
operating in the syndicated loan market use the same Libor benchmark (London Inter Bank 
Offered Rate) that underlies the TED spread. To the extent that banks in emerging markets 
fund themselves through wholesale borrowing abroad, they are directly influenced by 
changing liquidity conditions at the core of the global financial system. Analysing both sets 
of loans allows us nevertheless to test whether domestic and international syndicates differ in 
their sensitivity to the TED spread. If no major differences exist, we can be assured that the 
TED spread adequately captures market liquidity for most loans in our dataset. 
The first nine columns show regression results for the full sample, whereas the last three 
columns show similar regressions for the sample of international syndicated loans. As 
dependent variables we use the total loan share held by the arrangers, the loan share held by 
each arranger on average and the loan share held by the two main arrangers, respectively. For 
the sample of international loans we only show the regressions where the total loan share is 
the dependent variable (the results for the other two dependent variables are virtually 
identical). We control for various loan and borrower characteristics and include regional 
dummies (the latter not shown). 
The first column in each set of three regressions shows a highly significant and positive 
impact of the TED spread on retention rates. When interbank liquidity is tight, retention rates 
are higher as funding pressures make banks less eager to participate in syndicated loans. 
Arrangers – who earn most of the syndication fees and have a long-term interest in 
maintaining relationships with key borrowers – take on a bigger part of each loan. The TED 
spread as a measure of interbank liquidity works equally well for domestic and international 
syndicated loans. 
In the second column in each set we then simultaneously include TED spread and Crisis to 
perform an empirical “horse race” between these potential drivers of retention rates. 
Interestingly, when we add our Crisis dummy the impact of liquidity becomes (just) 
insignificant. The shock of the crisis itself turns out to be the dominant driver of the increase 
in retention rates. During the crisis the total loan share held by arrangers increases by 3.9 
percentage points (compared with a pre-crisis mean of 50 per cent), the mean arranger share 
increases by 1.4 percentage points (pre-crisis mean 27 per cent) while the share held by the 
two largest arrangers increases by 2.4 percentage points (pre-crisis mean 38 per cent). Lastly, 
the third column in each set shows that adding a Post Lehman dummy does not add to the 
explanatory power of our model (adding the Lehman dummy even slightly adds to the 
precision of the estimates of the Crisis impact). The impact of the crisis on retention rates had 
already happened before the Lehman collapse. 
  13TED spread 0.039*** 0.015 0.014 0.009** 0.000 -0.001 0.024*** 0.008 0.007 0.046*** 0.017 0.016
[0.000] [0.105] [0.140] [0.048] [0.981] [0.910] [0.000] [0.349] [0.440] [0.000] [0.187] [0.211]
Crisis 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.014* 0.019** 0.024** 0.032*** 0.042*** 0.050***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.086] [0.024] [0.011] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001]
Post Lehman -0.016 -0.012 -0.017 -0.021
[0.177] [0.152] [0.110] [0.176]
Volume -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Maturity -0.014** -0.012* -0.013* -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.010* -0.008 -0.009 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003
[0.025] [0.074] [0.058] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.085] [0.164] [0.127] [0.603] [0.878] [0.753]
Secure 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.050***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Guarantee -0.022** -0.022** -0.022** -0.017** -0.018** -0.018** -0.021** -0.021** -0.021** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.035***
[0.047] [0.044] [0.042] [0.028] [0.027] [0.026] [0.041] [0.039] [0.037] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006]
RepBor -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.003* -0.003* -0.002* -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004* -0.004* -0.004*
[0.026] [0.029] [0.028] [0.088] [0.091] [0.094] [0.017] [0.020] [0.018] [0.062] [0.069] [0.067]
Rated -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
Split -0.011 -0.015 -0.010*** -0.144** -0.145** -0.005*** -0.088 -0.091 -0.010*** 0.046 0.042 -0.007***
[0.903] [0.868] [0.000] [0.045] [0.042] [0.000] [0.275] [0.260] [0.000] [0.685] [0.710] [0.000]
RepArr -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.052*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.086*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.057*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.046***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
InstInv -0.097*** -0.097*** 0.029* -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.040*** -0.069*** -0.068*** 0.023* -0.103*** -0.102*** 0.027
[0.000] [0.000] [0.052] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.098] [0.000] [0.000] [0.135]
Refin -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.055*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.050***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Acq 0.027* 0.029* -0.097*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.034*** 0.021 0.022 -0.069*** 0.025 0.026 -0.102***
[0.073] [0.056] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.127] [0.107] [0.000] [0.154] [0.145] [0.000]
Corp -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.014 -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.145** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.09 -0.051*** -0.051*** 0.042
[0.000] [0.000] [0.874] [0.000] [0.000] [0.043] [0.000] [0.000] [0.265] [0.000] [0.000] [0.709]
ArrNum 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.064*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.061***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 4,252 4,252 4,252 4,252 4,252 4,252 4,252 4,252 4,252 2,939 2,939 2,939
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 3 40 . 3 50 . 3 50 . 4 40 . 4 40 . 4 40 . 2 30 . 2 30 . 2 3 0 . 3 60 . 3 70 . 3 7
Table 2: Impact of the crisis on retention rates: is there a wake-up call effect?
Total Share Held By Top 2 Arrangers Total Share Held By Arrangers Mean Share Held By Arrangers Total Share Held By Arrangers
All loans Only international loans
This table shows the impact of the crisis on retention rates. TED spread equals the difference between the three-month LIBOR and the interest rate on U.S. T-bills of the same maturity. Crisis is a dummy which is one for the crisis period (October 2007 -
October 2009) and zero for the pre-crisis period (January 2005 - September 2007). Post Lehman is a dummy which is one for the period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (15 September 2008) and zero otherwise. Volume equals the log of the loan amount in 
dollars. Maturity is the log of the maturity of the loan in days. Secure and Guarantee are dummies which are one if the loan is secured or guaranteed, respectively. RepBor measures the number of times the borrower has raised a syndicated loan since 2000
(including the current loan). Rated is a dummy which is one if the borrower has a rating from S&P and/or Moody's. Split measures the share of firms in the borrower's industry that are rated differently by S&P and Moody's. RepArr measures the total market
share of the arrangers in the year prior to loan signing. InstInv is a dummy which is one if at least one of the participants is an institutional investor. Refin, Acq and Corpare loan purpose dummies which are one if the main loan purpose is refinancing, acquisition
or general corporate borrowing, respectively. ArrNum equals the number of arrangers in the loan. International loans are loans with at least one lender from a different country as the borrower. The model is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by borrower. All regressions include a constant and regional dummies. Robust p-values appear in brackets and ***, ** and * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance, respectively. 
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20 We only interact with Crisis and not with Post Lehman as the latter variable did not have any additional 
explanatory power. Crisis 0.063*** 0.040*** -0.187 0.044*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.038***













































TED spread 0.015 0.015 0.016* 0.016* 0.013 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.018* 0.013
[0.111] [0.108] [0.095] [0.097] [0.162] [0.235] [0.125] [0.107] [0.240] [0.054] [0.151]
Observations 4,252 4,252 4,252 4,252 4,240 4,239 4,240 4,240 4,241 4,241 4,239
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.42 0.40 0.39
Table 3: Information asymmetry and the impact of the crisis on retention rates
Syndicate-specific knowledge about the borrower




This table shows how information asymmetries affect the impact of the crisis on retention rates. The dependent variable is the share of the loans jointly held by the
arrangers. Crisis is a dummy which is one for the crisis period (October 2007 - October 2009) and zero for the pre-crisis period (January 2005 - September 2007).
RepBor measures the number of times the borrower has raised a syndicated loan since 2000 (including the current loan). Rated is a dummy which is one if the borrower
has a rating from S&P and/or Moody's. Split measures the share of firms in the borrower's industry that are rated differently by S&P and Moody's. BorArr (BorPart )
measures the share of arrangers (participants) that were at least once part of a syndicate to the same borrower. ArrSec (PartSec )a n dArrCountry (PartCountry) measure
the number of times one or more of the arrangers (participants) were part of a syndicate to the same sector or country. RepArr measures the total market share of the
arrangers in the year prior to loan signing. PartArr measures the number of times the participants have had previous dealings with the arrangers in the syndicate. TED 
spread equals the difference between the three-month LIBOR and the interest rate on U.S. T-bills of the same maturity. All regressions include the same controls as in
Table 2. However, for reasons of brevity and clarity we only show the parameter estimates of RepBor, Rated, Split and RepArr for the regressions that include the
interaction terms with these variables. The model is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by borrower. Robust p-values appear
in brackets and ***, ** and * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
  16We replicate our finding that on average arrangers needed to retain significantly larger loan 
shares during the crisis. More importantly, we also find that the size of this wake-up call 
effect strongly depends on the severity of the agency problems that plague a loan. First, we 
find that the increase in retention rates is significantly smaller for repeat borrowers (column 
1). While having a rating or not does not have a (statistically significant) negative impact on 
the crisis-related increase in retention rates (column 2), we do find that loans to borrowers 
from relatively transparent industries – with fewer split ratings – saw a smaller increase in 
retention rates (column 3).
21 
Our second set of agency variables looks at various forms of information asymmetry between 
the lending syndicate and the borrower. We expect that loans where such asymmetries were 
small saw a smaller increase in retention rates during the crisis. This is indeed what we find. 
Syndicates that are structured by arrangers that have previously dealt with the same borrower, 
the same country, or the same sector see a smaller increase in retention rates than syndicates 
where arrangers are working on less familiar territory. In a similar vein, we find that previous 
relationships between the participants themselves and the borrower, its industry, or its 
country of incorporation reduce their concerns about adequate screening and monitoring. As 
a result, retention rates needed to increase significantly less during the crisis for these 
“familiar” loans. 
Our third set of agency variables captures information asymmetries within the lending 
syndicate. We find – as expected – that arranger reputation (measured as the market share in 
the syndicated loan market in the previous year) matters. Experienced arrangers still need to 
increase their retention rates during the crisis, but they need to do so far less than less-
experienced competitors. Lender reputation is an important mechanism to control agency 
problems within the syndicate, in particular during episodes of financial turmoil.
22 Lastly, we 
also find that retention rates increase less during the crisis when the participants had previous 
dealings with the arrangers in the syndicate. Building relationships reduces asymmetric 
information problems and increases trust within the syndicate. 
3.3. Economic significance of results 
Table 4 shows the economic relevance of our results. For an average loan the retention rate 
increased by almost 8 per cent during the crisis (the share of the loan jointly held by the 
arrangers increased by 3.9 percentage points compared with a pre-crisis mean of 50). 
However, when we allow for differences in asymmetric information we see that the impact of 
the crisis on the required retention rate differs substantially across loans. 
 
                                                 
21 In the split rating regression the main crisis coefficient is negative (p=0.12). Because the split rating variable 
ranges between 0.60 and 0.76 the total crisis impact on retention rate is nevertheless positive and ranges 
between 0.02 and 0.07 depending on the percentage of split ratings in the borrower’s industry. 
22 Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, and Steffanoni (2008) use a similar arranger reputation variable and show for a 
large sample of syndicated project finance loans that during the East Asian and Russian financial crises arranger 
reputation was a valuable loan certification mechanism. The authors focus on the impact on loan spreads and 
show that during a crisis reluctant participants are willing to pay for good arrangers in the form of increased 
arranger fees. We find that this reluctance also translates into different lending structures and that this result also 
holds for a broader group of syndicated loans and not just project finance loans. 
  17Percentage increase retention 
rate compared to pre-crisis 
mean (0.50)
Overall crisis impact  7.8
if first time borrower 10.6
if repeat borrower (mean RepBor=2.5) 7.6
if rated 8.0
if unrated 8.0
if transparent industry (Split=0.60) 4.0
if opaque industry (Split=0.76) 5.0
if all are arrangers unfamiliar with borrower 8.8
if arrangers have some knowledge about borrower (mean BorArr=0.42) 5.6
if arrangers have no knowledge about sector 10.4
if arrangers have some knowledge about sector (mean ArrSec=1.27) 8.4
if arrangers have no knowledge about country 9.2
if arrangers have some knowledge about country (mean ArrCountry=4.21) 7.6
if all participants are unfamiliar with borrower 9.4
if participants have some knowledge about borrower (mean BorPart=0.29) 5.0
if participants have no knowledge about sector 9.4
if participants have some knowledge about sector (mean PartSec=1.38) 3.0
if participants have no knowledge about country 9.4
if participants have some knowledge about country (mean PartCountry=3.91) 5.4
if arrangers have no reputation 9.4
if arrangers have some reputation (mean ArrRep=2.05) 3.7
if participants have no prior dealings with any of the arrangers 7.6
if participants have some prior dealings with arrangers (mean PartArr=6.28) 3.8
Table 4: Economic significance of crisis impact on retention rates
The table shows the economic effects of the impact of the crisis on retetion rates taking differences in asymmetric information between borrower
and syndicate or within the syndicate into account. The economic effects are calculated with respect ot the pre-crisis mean of the share of the loan
jointly held by the arrangers. 
The table shows the economic significance of the crisis impact on retention rates for loans with varying levels of asymmetric information
between borrower and syndicate or within the syndicate. The economic effects are calculated relative to the pre-crisis mean of the share of the
loan jointly held by the arrangers.
 
For example, while the retention rate for loans to first-time borrowers increased by 10.6 per 
cent, arrangers of syndicated loans to borrowers with average borrowing experience (two and 
a half loans) only needed to increase their retention rate by 7.6 per cent during the crisis. 
Furthermore, the retention rate for loans where participants were unfamiliar with the 
borrower country (sector) increased by 9.4 (9.4) per cent while those loans in which 
participants had average experience with the country (sector) the retention rate increased by 
only 5.4 (3.0) per cent. Lastly, retention rates for loans syndicated by arrangers without 
reputation increased by 9.4 per cent, while retention rates only increased by 3.7 per cent for 
loans syndicated by arrangers with average reputation. More transparent borrowers, more 
experienced participants, and more reputable arrangers all contributed to contain the crisis-
related correction in the required screening and monitoring intensity and thus in retention 
rates. 
Although we cannot establish for sure that the overall increase in retention rates can be fully 
attributed to intensified screening and monitoring, because unobserved borrower risk may 
potentially also have had an impact, we demonstrate that the crisis impact on retention rates 
differed significantly between loans with high and low levels of asymmetric information. Our 
results therefore indicate that bank screening and monitoring became stricter during the 
financial crisis: the crisis acted as a wake-up call. 
 
  184. Robustness 
We have identified a strong increase in retention rates during the crisis and argued that this 
sudden increase cannot only be explained by fluctuations in interbank liquidity or increased 
(unobserved) borrower risk. Instead we show that the retention rate increase is strongly 
related to the level of information asymmetry between the borrower and the syndicate (or 
within the syndicate) in line with an increased focus on screening and monitoring during the 
crisis. We proceed with a number of tests to see whether our results are robust to different 
specifications and data samples. In each robustness test we include the control variables of 
the baseline regressions (Table 2) but do not show the coefficients in Table 5 for reasons of 
brevity (available on request from the authors). 
4.1. Other loan categories 
We start by making sure that our baseline results are not driven by the exclusion of certain 
loan categories. We first analyse whether our results are influenced by the fact that during the 
crisis the proportion of club deals increases. Club deals are syndicated loans where the 
borrower itself selects the syndicate members, usually a group of relationship lenders. All 
lenders have a more or less equal standing and get an (almost) equal fee share. Club deals 
thus lack the typical two-tier structure of syndicated loans and for this reason we have 
excluded them so far. Club deals are included and earmarked in the Loan Analytics database. 
The percentage of loans labelled as club deals increases during the crisis from 6 to 10 per 
cent. We re-ran our baseline regressions while including club deals and found that this does 
not change our earlier results. 
Second, we check whether including project finance loans changes our results. Project 
finance loans are syndicated loans to fund a legally independent project. They are to be repaid 
with the cash flows of that specific project without any recourse to assets of the project 
sponsors (the equity investors). The project companies involved are often highly leveraged. 
On the one hand, this combination of high leverage and limited recourse means that lenders 
take extra care in screening and monitoring the borrower (Esty and Megginson, 2003). On the 
other hand, findings based on project finance alone are difficult to generalise to bank lending 
more generally. Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) provide detailed evidence on how project 
finance and non-project finance syndicated loans differ in terms of syndicate structure, loan 
pricing and other loan attributes and conclude that “project finance loans differ rather 
fundamentally from non-project finance loans in almost every important aspect (p. 87)”. For 
this reason we chose to focus on general syndicated loans. However, when we include project 
finance loans in our sample – and use a project finance dummy in the regressions – our 
results remain quantitatively and qualitatively the same. 
  19Basic RepBor Rated Split BorArr ArrSec ArrCountry BorPart PartSec PartCountry RepArr PartArr
Crisis 0.059*** 0.079*** 0.060*** -0.196 0.076*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.065*** 0.059***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.120] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Crisis*X -0.008*** -0.01 0.381** -0.046*** -0.012*** -0.004*** -0.057*** -0.016*** -0.006*** -0.003 -0.004***
[0.001] [0.627] [0.042] [0.003] [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.171] [0.000]
X -0.003** -0.021 -0.286** -0.042*** 0.010*** 0.003*** -0.160*** -0.049*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006***
[0.029] [0.102] [0.012] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Crisis 0.028*** 0.052*** 0.031*** -0.229* 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.024**
[0.006] [0.000] [0.004] [0.051] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.020]
Crisis*X -0.010*** -0.02 0.383** -0.030** -0.007** -0.002*** -0.024 -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.003 -0.003***
[0.000] [0.280] [0.028] [0.037] [0.050] [0.006] [0.137] [0.008] [0.000] [0.195] [0.000]
X -0.003** -0.033*** -0.164 -0.042*** 0.009*** 0.002*** -0.078*** -0.037*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.005***
[0.024] [0.007] [0.106] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Crisis 0.035*** 0.063*** 0.039*** -0.184 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.039***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.129] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Crisis*X -0.010*** -0.023 0.327* -0.037** -0.009** -0.002*** -0.029* -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.004* -0.003***
[0.000] [0.218] [0.069] [0.010] [0.015] [0.003] [0.078] [0.003] [0.000] [0.070] [0.000]
X -0.003** -0.033*** -0.109 -0.042*** 0.010*** 0.003*** -0.075*** -0.036*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.005***
[0.031] [0.008] [0.294] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Demand -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.367] [0.285] [0.348] [0.407] [0.260] [0.359] [0.299] [0.353] [0.311] [0.583] [0.372] [0.892]
Crisis 0.035*** 0.062*** 0.041*** -0.177 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.032***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.146] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003]
Crisis*X -0.010*** -0.029* 0.317* -0.044*** -0.007* -0.002** -0.034** -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.004* -0.002***
[0.000] [0.094] [0.080] [0.002] [0.085] [0.016] [0.040] [0.003] [0.000] [0.092] [0.000]
X -0.004*** -0.043*** -0.132 -0.039*** 0.012*** 0.004*** -0.073*** -0.032*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.004***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.200] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Busy -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Crisis 0.043*** 0.072*** 0.051*** -0.162 0.066*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.056*** 0.049*** 0.045***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.186] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Crisis*X -0.011*** -0.043** 0.306* -0.051*** -0.007* -0.002*** -0.038** -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.003 -0.003***
[0.000] [0.015] [0.094] [0.000] [0.086] [0.009] [0.022] [0.002] [0.000] [0.154] [0.000]
X -0.004*** -0.033*** -0.079 -0.038*** 0.015*** 0.004*** -0.084*** -0.037*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.006***
[0.000] [0.003] [0.450] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Individualism -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Crisis 0.030*** 0.057*** 0.033*** -0.263** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.027***
[0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.040] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.004]
Crisis*X -0.010*** -0.019 0.438** -0.037** -0.008** -0.003*** -0.033* -0.010** -0.005*** -0.005** -0.003***
[0.000] [0.322] [0.021] [0.016] [0.032] [0.003] [0.057] [0.010] [0.000] [0.049] [0.000]
X -0.004** -0.035*** -0.132 -0.044*** 0.010*** 0.002*** -0.076*** -0.037*** -0.008*** -0.004** -0.005***
[0.033] [0.004] [0.189] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.016] [0.000]
Crisis 0.030*** 0.055*** 0.034*** -0.192 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.031***
[0.007] [0.000] [0.003] [0.153] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.008] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.007]
Crisis*X -0.010*** -0.028 0.331* -0.026 -0.008* -0.002** -0.011 -0.007* -0.004*** -0.005* -0.002***
[0.001] [0.199] [0.097] [0.113] [0.053] [0.016] [0.548] [0.100] [0.000] [0.065] [0.001]
X -0.004 -0.021 -0.088 -0.050*** 0.011*** 0.003*** -0.091*** -0.041*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.006***
[0.121] [0.260] [0.530] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.010] [0.000]
Crisis 0.033*** 0.062*** 0.036*** -0.173 0.051*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.036***
[0.004] [0.000] [0.002] [0.176] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
Crisis*X -0.011*** -0.020 0.307* -0.041*** -0.009** -0.003*** -0.032* -0.012*** -0.005*** -0.005** -0.003***
[0.000] [0.305] [0.100] [0.008] [0.022] [0.003] [0.060] [0.003] [0.000] [0.040] [0.000]
X -0.004** -0.037*** -0.122 -0.043*** 0.009*** 0.002*** -0.088*** -0.038*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.006***
[0.037] [0.004] [0.257] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Including club deals
Table 5: Robustness tests
Tobit 
Including project finance loans
Start crisis January 2008
Begin sample period January 2006
Correction for changes in demand for syndicated loans
Heckman selection model - selection variable is busy
Heckman selection model - selection variable is individualism
This table shows several robustness tests. The dependent variable is the share of the loan jointly held by the arrangers. Crisis is a dummy which is one for the crisis period
(October 2007 - October 2009) and zero for the pre-crisis period (January 2005 - September 2007). RepBor measures the number of times the borrower has raised a
syndicated loan since 2000 (including the current loan). Rated is a dummy which is one if the borrower has a rating from S&P and/or Moody's. Split measures the share of
firms in borrower's industry that are rated differently by S&P and Moody's. BorArr (BorPart) measures the share of arrangers (participants) that were at least once part of a
syndicate to the same borrower. ArrSec (PartSec )a n dArrCountry (PartCountry) measure the number of times one or more of the arrangers (participants) were part of a
syndicate to the same sector or country. RepArr measures the total market share of the arrangers in the year prior to loan signing. PartArr measures the number of times the
participants have had previous dealings with the arrangers in the syndicate. X refers to the variable mentioned in the heading of the column. Demand equals the average
GDP growth in countries where arrangers were active prior to the crisis (see main text for exact definition). In Heckman regressions we show the parameter estimates for
the respective selection variables as well. Busy equals the sum of the number of other loans that the arrangers of a particular loan arranged in the same year. Individualism
equals the average country score on Individualism on the Hofstede (2001) index for the arrangers in the loan. All regressions include the same controlsa si nT a b l e2 .T h e
model is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by borrower. Robust p-values appear in brackets and ***, **a n d*c o r r e s p o n dt o
one, five and ten percent level of significance, respectively. 
 
  204.2. Demand correction 
Next we control for the possibility that during the crisis the demand for syndicated loans 
dropped. A lower demand would mean that, all else equal, arrangers were less constrained by 
their capital base and thus decided to keep more of each loan on their balance sheet. A priori 
we think this explanation is unlikely as this crisis started as a pure financial crisis, with 
initially a limited impact on economic growth and loan demand. Only during the later stages 
of the crisis, in particular after the Lehman collapse, did trade and growth contract 
precipitously. To proxy for the severity of the reduction in loan demand at the individual 
arranger level, we create a quarterly variable that measures average quarter-on-quarter GDP 
growth in the countries where the arranger was active in the pre-crisis period. We weigh the 
countries by their share in the total pre-crisis loan portfolio of the arranger. As expected this 
variable only becomes negative in October 2008, when the financial crisis turned into a real 
crisis in the wake of the Lehman bankruptcy. When we add this variable, its coefficient is 
negative (lower loan demand leads to higher retention rates) but insignificant, while our main 
results are robust to this demand correction. 
4.3. Sample selection 
Our regressions are based on a subsample that contains detailed information on the 
distribution of the loan over the various arrangers and participants. Only about 25 per cent of 
the loan entries in Loan Analytics contain such information. When arrangers report a loan to 
Dealogic they need to fill out a standard form which contains basic information about the 
loan deal as well as more detailed information such as the exact loan distribution. Whereas 
arrangers have an incentive to declare the deal to Dealogic – it then counts towards their 
league table position – they do not have a strong incentive to provide Dealogic with all 
information. This is mostly left to the discretion of the bank. Although our subsample is 
overall quite similar to the full data set, we are still worried that some of our results may be 
driven by selection bias in the sense that certain types of lenders tend to disclose more 
information than others. 
We therefore estimate two variants of a two-step Heckman (1979) selection procedure in 
which we use in the first stage equation a number of instruments that we expect to be linked 
to the propensity of arrangers to diligently fill out the Dealogic loan forms. The first 
instrument is the number of other loans that the arrangers of a particular loan organise in the 
same year. We expect that “busy” arrangers with a high loan flow are less inclined to provide 
detailed information about each loan. Second, we use the average value of the country score 
on “Individualism” of the Hofstede (2001) index. Arrangers based in “individualist” countries 
may be less inclined to fill out information than those in collectivist countries. As expected 
we find that loans with busy arrangers and loans with arrangers from more individualist 
societies contain less often full information. While we find some evidence of self-selection in 
our sample – the estimated coefficients for the inverse Mill’s ratio are not consistently 
statistically insignificant – Table 5 shows that our earlier results are not affected by this.  
4.4. Different periods and estimation technique 
Next, we do some further methodological checks by experimenting with a different crisis 
definition, sample period, and estimation method. While August 2007 is generally regarded 
as the start of the crisis the negative impact on financing conditions increased during the 
following months. This means that our “early start” of the crisis is a conservative approach 
when estimating the crisis impact on bank behaviour. Our results are robust to starting the 
crisis at a later point in time (January 2008) and, apart from losing significance of some of the 
  21interaction variables, also remain the same when we start our pre-crisis period in January 
2006 instead of January 2005. Lastly, our results do not change when we use a Tobit 
regression technique rather than OLS or when errors are clustered at the sector instead of 
borrower level (last regression not shown).  
4.5. Moral hazard versus adverse selection 
We interpret our results as evidence of an increased need to screen and monitor borrowers 
during the crisis. Participants want to make sure that borrowers have been adequately 
screened and will be adequately monitored before agreeing to participate in a syndicate. 
Arrangers need to keep a larger share on their books as participants are concerned about 
moral hazard with respect to arrangers’ efforts. However, an alternative interpretation could 
be that participants do not worry about arrangers’ screening and monitor efforts, but rather 
that, since arrangers have private information about the borrower, there will be adverse 
selection. In this case arrangers do not keep a larger loan share to convince participants that 
they adequately screen and monitor, but to convince them that they do not only sell down 
relative risky loans (“lemons”) (Akerlof, 1970; Parlour and Plantin, 2008). If this is the case, 
our results should not be interpreted as evidence that banks react to the crisis by increasing 
monitoring and screening. Rather, a high retention rate would mainly act as a signal or 
“certification” of the borrower.
23,24 Such certification may be particularly important during 
financial crises (Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson and Steffanoni, 2008). Regression four in Table 
3, however, helps us distinguish between these two possible explanations of our findings (cf. 
Sufi, 2007). 
If moral hazard on the part of the arrangers is driving our results, then the fact that the 
arrangers keep part of the loan reflects that both arrangers and participants have imperfect 
knowledge about the borrower and that the participants fear that the arrangers will not screen 
and monitor sufficiently. In this case, we expect that if there have been previous lending 
relationships between the arrangers and the borrower, participants are less worried: they 
know that the arrangers already know the borrower quite well and that additional screening 
and subsequent monitoring is less crucial. This would translate into a negative coefficient for 
the relationship variable, as participants feel less need to force arrangers to retain a large 
portion of the loan in order to prevent shirking. 
In the case of adverse selection, the existence of a previous relationship between the 
arrangers and the borrower implies that the arranger has an information advantage over the 
participants. Especially for these loans the arranger then has to signal to the participants that 
the loan is not risky. So in the adverse selection scenario, we expect a positive coefficient for 
the relationship variable: in the case of a loan to a previous client, the arrangers are forced to 
retain more of the loan and to form a more concentrated syndicate. The participants’ main 
worry is not so much that the arrangers have insufficiently screened the borrower or will not 
monitor her adequately, but rather that the arrangers actually know the borrower quite well 
and will abuse this information. 
                                                 
23 Banks are “special” because their screening generates proprietary information about the borrower. When a 
bank decides to lend to a borrower this decision is an implicit endorsement of the borrower as the bank is 
willing to put its own money at risk. Such a “certification” tends to have a positive impact on the market value 
of the borrower (James, 1987; Cook, Schellhorn and Spellman, 2003). 
24 Note that although the model of Holmström and Tirole (1997, p. 675) explicitly deals with moral hazard, the 
authors mention that their model can also be thought of as one in which the monitor takes a stake in the 
borrower to certify that the borrower is sound. 
  22The result in Table 3 shows that during the crisis participants took comfort in prior 
experience of arrangers rather than being put off by the possibility that arrangers would abuse 
their superior knowledge of the borrower. In other words, and in line with the wake-up call 
hypothesis, participants were mostly concerned about insufficient screening and monitoring 
by the arrangers (moral hazard) rather than arrangers selling “lemons” (adverse selection).
25  
 
                                                 
25 We continue to include our standard control variables, including the number of previous loans of the borrower 
as a proxy for the general level of information that is available in the market about the borrower.
 
  235. Conclusion 
During the global financial crisis the market for syndicated loans shrank significantly. 
Although reduced market liquidity likely played an important role, a renewed focus on 
screening and monitoring of borrowers may also have reduced the supply of loans. Although 
many believe that the crisis induced banks to step up their screening and monitoring, 
empirical evidence has so far been lacking. This paper provides this evidence by analysing 
almost 4,500 syndicated loans extended to private corporate borrowers between January 2005 
and October 2009. We find that, even when controlling for changes in interbank liquidity and 
borrower risk, retention rates increased significantly during the crisis, especially for loans 
characterised by high levels of information asymmetry between borrower and lenders or 
within the lending syndicate. This increase already materialised before the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers and the subsequent decline in global growth. The sub-prime mortgage 
problems that emerged in mid-2007 acted as a wake-up call for banks and led them to review 
their screening and monitoring standards of their corporate lending as well. 
Our findings bear on the current regulatory debate about minimum “skin in the game” 
retention rates for originating banks.
26 In July 2009 the European Parliament amended the 
Capital Requirements Directive by including a 5 per cent retention requirement for 
securitisations, while in May 2010 the US Senate passed the Financial Reform Bill which 
announces the introduction of similar regulations that require a securitiser “to retain not less 
than 5 per cent of the credit risk for any asset that is transferred, sold, or conveyed through 
the issuance of an asset-backed security by the securitiser”. Earlier plans to let minimum 
retention requirements not only apply to securitisations but also to syndicated loans have (at 
least for the time being) been shelved. 
At first sight our results confirm that regulatory retention requirements may indeed not be 
necessary for syndicated loans. After all, we document a strong, broad-based but market-
driven increase in retention rates among syndicate arrangers. Participants, concerned about 
arrangers’ lax screening and monitoring, were in many cases able to take corrective action 
without regulatory intervention. Although syndicated lending declined sharply, the market 
did not break down. This stands in contrast to the securitisation market, where the link 
between the originator and the ultimate investors was too severed to make any corrective (and 
collective) action possible. 
However, when the market for syndicated lending will expand again, and financial 
institutions once more start to compete heavily to participate in (oversubscribed) syndicated 
loans, the pressure on arrangers to retain loan portions that are high enough to guarantee 
sufficient screening and monitoring may gradually erode. Without the introduction of some 
form of mandatory retention rates for syndicated loans, the risk exists that old practices will 
soon return. This may in particular be the case if the secondary market for syndicated loans, 
where both arrangers and participants can offload their loan stakes, revives again (it dried up 
almost completely during the crisis). Syndicate participants that are likely to sell their loan 
stake in the secondary market will not be compelled to demand high retention rates from 
arrangers to ensure adequate screening and monitoring. Likewise, syndicate arrangers that 
sell most of the loan portions that they initially retained no longer have an incentive to screen 
and monitor.
27 Indeed, Berndt and Gupta (2009) show that borrowers whose loans are sold in 
the secondary syndicated loan market tend to under-perform in the medium term.
28 One way 
                                                 
26 See IMF (2009) and Fender and Mitchell (2009) for a critical discussion of these regulatory measures. 
27 After loan origination participants sell their stake much more often than arrangers (Ivashina and Sun, 2009). 
28 Benmelech, Dlugosz and Ivashina (2009) find that syndicated loans that are used to back collateralised loan 
obligations (CLOs) do not perform worse than unsecuritised syndicated loans. This suggests that incentives to 
  24to reduce such a negative impact of subsequent loan sales is to require arrangers to hold on to 
the loan portion they retained at origination. Although such a requirement could be 
introduced through legislation, participants themselves could also more often demand that 
restrictions on subsequent loan sales by arrangers are included in loan contracts. 
Our results also show that while there was a broad-based increase in retention rates during the 
crisis the marginal impacts differed across borrower types. This should warn against a 
simplistic, one-size-fits-all approach to setting minimum retention requirements for 
securitisations. Uniform retention requirements, such as the 5 per cent rule, may be too high 
for relatively sound borrower and asset types – and thus stifle the (re-)emergence of 
securitisation of such loans – while at the same time they may be too low for riskier 
borrowers – and thus insufficiently resolve agency problems. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
screen and monitor may remain sufficiently intact as long as not all participants sell their loan stakes to CLO 
vehicles. When only a limited part of a loan is reallocated to CLOs, the other “regular” participants may still 
ensure that the arrangers screen and monitor sufficiently. 
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